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NAFTA, Globalization and Free
Trade: Can the U.S. Maintain
Leadership in the World Economy?

Nevertheless, international trade is
constantly attacked—every candidate
(Republican and Democratic) in the
recent presidential election questioned
trade policies. The most vocifer
ous attacks came from now President
Donald Trump, who labeled the North
American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) the worst trade agreement
ever negotiated.

Elmore R. Alexander
uring election season in 2002, in an MBA
course on global management I was teaching Can we reconcile the positive effects of
at Philadelphia University, I identified
trade since World War II with current
sentiments in America? More impor
competitive U.S. congressional races where the issue
tantly, are we headed toward a sort of
of globalization was relevant. The students then
protectionism comparable to that expe
focused on these races to develop comprehensive
rienced during the Great Depression?
analyses of the candidates’ positions and understanding The Rise of
of globalization. The results were telling: the
Anti-Globalization
candidates who were judged by the students to
Nationalist sentiment is on the rise.
The shock of the United Kingdom’s
understand globalization best lost every single race.
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This is the quandary of globalization—
it involves complex issues that neither
political leaders nor the general public
completely understand. While 70 per
cent of Americans think it is important
to buy US products, 37 percent would
April 2018

refuse to pay more for a U.S. product.1
In reality, international trade has been a
positive force since World War II. Trade
has expanded, global living standards
have improved dramatically, and mil
lions world-wide have escaped poverty.2

June 2016 “Brexit” vote was fol
lowed by Donald Trump’s election
on a populist-nationalist agenda. The
trend continued across Europe from
the Czech Republic to Hungary,
Poland and Rumania. While there have
been recalibrations with Emmanuel
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Macron’s May 2017 defeat of rightwing populist Marine Le Pen in France
and the victory of Angela Merkel’s
centrist Christian Democratic Union in
Germany, Merkel is still struggling to
form a stable government, and nation
alistic rhetoric has not disappeared. It is
important to understand the underlying
dynamics of the movement as well as
the experience of workers in the cur
rent economy.

United States experienced its first pro
ductivity decline since 1982, which has
created an economic recovery without
wage growth.4 The final dynamic to
consider is the decline in global trade.
Global trade hit its apex in 2008. U.S.
trade actually declined $500 billion
in 2016.5` Growth is occurring only in
restricted industrial and geographic
sectors. In 1975, 109 firms accounted
for one-half of U.S. profits. By 2015,

U.S. agriculture depends heavily
on agricultural exports to Mexico
($18B) and Canada ($23B). If
NAFTA were to expire, tariffs on
agricultural products (currently
at zero) would jump dramatically
and bring devastation to
midwestern farmers.
Underlying Dynamics
There are three underlying dynamics
that must be considered. The first of
these involves recent declines in population growth rates. The post-World
War II period saw dramatic population
growth creating a young demographic.
Recently, growth rates have declined in
the developed world, resulting in an
older demographic. Japan and China
face the toughest challenges, but nine
of the 56 largest countries are already
dangerously older.3 The second
dynamic is equally important: there
has been stagnation in worker productivity. Productivity growth surged
during the “dot com” bubble.
However, since 2007, productivity
growth has been just one-half of that
experienced since 1945. In 2016, the
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that number had fallen to 30. In 2015,
75 percent of U.S. venture capital went
to just four metropolitan areas—New
York City, Boston, Los Angeles and San
Francisco.6 Today, American companies
seem to be more risk averse, choosing
to redistribute capital to shareholders
rather than investing in growth.

The Experience of
the Workforce
In addition, the American workforce
is undergoing significant change.
Manufacturing employment fell by
between six and seven million jobs in
the 2000s. The average income for the
bottom 90 percent of families has been
stagnant since 1980, and wage growth
has been one-half the rate of produc
tivity growth.7 Much of this has been
blamed on international trade. Clearly,
there are winners and losers from trade.8

Businesses and members of the skilled
workforce have typically benefited; in
contrast, lower-skilled workers have
typically been hurt. In reality, a sub
stantial proportion of the job losses are
attributable to automation as opposed
to trade. Nevertheless, only 35 per
cent of workers think that the U.S. has
benefited from globalization while 55
percent believe that we have lost.9 Given
these trends and the experience of the
workforce, the rise of nationalist senti
ment is not surprising.

The Current State of U.S.
Trade Policy
Upon taking office, President Trump
withdrew from the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) negotiations, a
proposed trade agreement that would
have linked the U.S. economy to 12
countries in the Asia-Pacific region
and North America. Next, he began
renegotiating NAFTA and threaten
ing action on numerous bilateral fronts
from Korea to China. The President’s
rhetoric has been loud and aggressive,
especially as it has concerned NAFTA.
Indeed, NAFTA has been controver
sial in North America, ever since it
was signed with Canada and Mexico
in 1993. The agreement consists of six
basic provisions: a) the elimination
of duties and tariffs for goods traded
between the three countries; b) the
protection of the foreign direct invest
ment of the three countries; c) the
protection of intellectual property; d)
ensuring ease of movement for business
travelers; e) mechanisms for independ
ent resolution of trade disputes; and f )
freer access to government procure
ment for suppliers from each coun
try.10 The details are complicated and
controversial. With the exception of
the provisions for dispute resolution
and the definition of what constitutes a
NAFTA-compliant product, however,
the disputes that have emerged among
the partners since 1993 have focused
more on outcomes than on the specific
provisions of the agreement.
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Why is NAFTA so significant? NAFTA
combined two developed economies
with a developing one (a first in mod
ern trade history). More concretely, it
encompasses fully one quarter of global
trade.11 Interestingly, most NAFTA
trade is focused on “intermediate
goods” (components that make up
parts of finished goods). For example,
automotive components cross U.S.Canadian and U.S.-Mexican borders
approximately eight times before a
completed car reaches a U.S. show
room.12 This illustrates the economic

concept of “comparative advantage.”
Each country specializes in what it does
best, yielding a higher-quality and lessexpensive product and raising the Gross
Domestic Products of all. The resulting
integrated North American economy is
primed to compete in Asia, Europe and
the rest of the world.
In the past 25 years, trade among the
three NAFTA countries has increased
threefold—from approximately $300
billion in 1993 to $1.1 trillion in 2016.13
The integration of the three economies
is dramatic. Forty-five percent of the
value of U.S. imports from Mexico
is attributable to U.S. components.
Similarly, 25 percent of the average
import from Canada is comprised of
U.S. components. In contrast, integra
tion with the Chinese economy is only
four percent.14 Fourteen million U.S.
jobs depend on NAFTA trade. Possibly
100,000 manufacturing jobs have been
lost to NAFTA trade—0.1 percent of
April 2018

the U.S. labor force, a miniscule num
ber when compared to recent monthly
job growth of approximately 150,000
jobs. Furthermore, U.S. states with a
higher proportion of NAFTA trade
have a higher involvement in advanced
manufacturing, and the jobs created
by NAFTA pay 15 to 20 percent more
than the jobs that were lost.15
Has NAFTA increased trade deficits?
First, there is not a deficit with Canada.
The exact number varies from slightly
positive to slightly negative from year

to year. With Mexico, trade has moved
from a surplus of $1.7 billion before the
agreement took effect to a deficit of
$61.2 billion in 2016.16 The intermedi
ate trade effect (percentage of imported
products with U.S. components), how
ever, means that that the deficit is closer
to $30 billion. While that number may
seem worrisome, consider the larger
context keeping in mind that it is only
about 5 percent of our overall trade
deficit. Trade deficits do not result from
trade agreements. They are macroeco
nomic phenomena caused by low U.S.
consumer savings and the attractive
ness of the U.S. as a stable location for
investment.17 Unless U.S. consumers
spend less and save more, and the U.S.
becomes a more risky location for
foreign investment, trade deficits will
remain. Forcing a decrease in the U.S.Mexico trade imbalance through some
artificial means will merely shift the
deficit to another country or region of
the world.

NAFTA: The Negotiations
The initial NAFTA renegotiation
process in the spring and summer of
2017 was very positive. Congressional
hearings were held soliciting input
from a wide variety of interest groups.
Seasoned trade professionals who had
been a part of the original NAFTA
negotiations were appointed to han
dle the talks. The announced objec
tives were thoughtful and moderate,
and reflected the interests of both
Republicans and Democrats.18 They

focus on four goals: a) higher-paying
U.S. jobs; b) growing the U.S. econ
omy; c) reducing the trade deficit; and
d) trade rule enforcement reform. The
first negotiation rounds resulted in
agreement on many issues including
those involving the environment, tel
ecommunications, digital trade, smalland medium-sized businesses, and
services.19 Even the rhetoric surround
ing the negotiations was positive.
Then things became complicated.
In late fall 2017, the U.S. began
making untenable demands on the
Canadians and Mexicans. Repeatedly,
President Trump threatened to pull
out of the talks.20 Intense lobbying to
preserve NAFTA by U.S. businesses
and both Republican and Democratic
Congressional representatives
ensued. The administration’s
rhetoric intensified.
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From a technical perspective, three
issues remain. The first concerns
reducing the trade deficit with Mexico.
Since the deficit cannot be addressed
directly, the push from U.S. negotiators
has been to alter the “rules of origin”
(what qualifies a product as “NAFTAcompliant” and thus renders it eligible
for free trade) to require a minimum
of 50 percent U.S. content.21 The Mexi
cans and Canadians have said that this
is unacceptable, and there have been
some indications that the U.S. would
settle for 35 percent U.S. content.22
Since the discussion of this issue has
become a numbers question, there is
conceivably room for compromise
involving lower levels of U.S. content
and other concessions.
The second issue involves the over
all “rules of origin.” Currently, the
requirement for a product to be
NAFTA-compliant is that 62.5 percent
of the product must be attributable to
North American production.23 The
U.S. is now demanding that the limit
be raised to 85 percent.24 It is likely that
a compromise is possible in the low
70s.25 Recently, Canadian negotiators
proposed creative new strategies that
may yield an agreement.26
The final issue involves arbitration
panels. One of the successes of NAFTA
from the perspective of promoting
trade has been the requirement that
trade disputes among the three coun
tries be handled by independent arbitra
tion panels. The U.S. wants to elimi
nate these panels allowing resolution to

happen in the court systems of the three
countries. Canada is strongly commit
ted to retaining the panels and actually
walked out of the original negotiations
over this issue.27 This issue is clouded
by the issue of sovereignty.28 It is hard
to predict whether or not a compromise
is possible.
Recently, the U.S. has added a “sun
set” demand abrogating the agreement
after five years.29 This is unacceptable
by both Mexico and Canada, and U.S.
businesses indicate that it renders the
agreement meaningless. This has been
accompanied by increasingly confron
tational U.S. rhetoric.

NAFTA: The Aftermath
Although a survey of North American
economists predicts a successful
renegotiation,30 the outcome of the
NAFTA negotiations is unclear. U.S.
businesses from advanced manufactur
ing to agriculture strongly support an
updated NAFTA, but it is not clear that
the administration wishes to proceed.
This led a vice president of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce to character
ize the administration’s position as a
policy without a constituency.31 That
said, President Trump did moderate his
rhetoric in his January 2018 speech to
the World Economic Forum in Davos.32
It is difficult to imagine a North
American economy without NAFTA.
The disruption of supply chains that
would result from expiration of the
agreement would be monumental.
Automotive manufacturing disruption

It is difficult to imagine a North
American economy without
NAFTA. The disruption of
supply chains that would result
from expiration of the agreement
would be monumental.
14

would be significant with increases
in manufacturing costs of as much as
$27 billion and, one Bloomberg report
held, an average increase in the price of
automobiles of $1,000.33 “Just-In-Time”
processes could fail, compromising the
effectiveness of advanced manufactur
ing—a hallmark of U.S. competitive
ness. U.S. agriculture depends heavily
on agricultural exports to Mexico
($18B) and Canada ($23B). If NAFTA
were to expire, tariffs on agricultural
products (currently at zero) would
jump dramatically and bring devasta
tion to midwestern farmers.34
While the economic impact of with
drawal from NAFTA would be
significant, a more important question
concerns the position of the U.S. in the
world economy. The posture taken by
the Trump administration contrasts
with that of every administration since
World War II, each of which favored
free trade and engagement in econo
mies around the world. To the extent
that there is an interest in negotiating
trade agreements within the Trump
administration, it is in bilateral as
opposed to multilateral agreements.
While bilateral agreements certainly
have their place in the world economy,
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world trade is increasingly complex.
Supply chains seldom involve just one
border and potential conflict caused
by bilateral agreements can negate any
advantages. What’s more, the “America
First” perspective is clearly seen by the
rest of the world as the U.S. abdicat
ing its long-held leadership role. The
remainder of the TPP group (including
Canada, Mexico, Japan and Australia)
has reached an agreement without the
U.S.35 Canada has negotiated a new
agreement with the European Union
yielding almost zero duties.36 Mexico
has moved to increase its imports of
corn from Brazil and Argentina.37 The
U.S. is in danger of being left behind.

Are we headed to a last-minute
agreement to modernize NAFTA;
or is its demise imminent? As I write
this in February, it is impossible to
know. What is clear is that NAFTA
has enhanced the state of our workforce and the competitiveness of our
economy. However, we have not
developed a “safety net” to protect
workers harmed by international trade.
Without such protections, we should
not be surprised by current populist
nationalist sentiments.
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